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Upon assuming office in January 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama demanded a 
dramatic policy shift in Afghanistan. Government corruption and lawlessness were 
fueling the Taliban insurgency. State courts sought rents rather than justice. Obama 
promised a new approach to halt the steadily deteriorating security situation, bolster the 
state’s failing legitimacy, and reverse the Taliban’s striking resurgence. Promoting the 
rule of law and ending the justice vacuum would be at the center of U.S. policy, along 
with military force.
1  Advancing the rule of law constituted a hallmark of U.S. counterinsurgency. The 
official policy declared, “Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating 
predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the 
Taliban have exploited.” 2 In one sense, the Obama administration had identified a central 
truth; post-conflict state-building constitutes a major domestic and international endeavor 
with profound transnational security implications. 3  Establishing a viable state justice 
sector is vital to the overall success or failure of state-building efforts.4 
The Obama administration failed to understand the consequences of legal 
pluralism, in which “two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field,” in its 
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approach to advancing the rule of law, however.5 There never was a justice vacuum in 
Afghanistan. 6  Nonstate justice, particularly the local community dispute resolution 
mechanisms known as jirgas and shuras, maintained legal order in most of the country.7 
Simultaneously, Taliban justice began successfully asserting itself against the state in 
many places, not merely filling a void.  
The state-building endeavor in Afghanistan has constituted a major U.S. foreign 
policy and national security priority for more than a decade. 8  The rebuilding effort 
received an extraordinarily high-level of international support. In fact, the Afghan state 
depended on U.S. support to undertake even its most basic of functions, such as 
maintaining police, courts, and the military.9 In the justice sector, roughly 90 percent of 
funding came from foreign sources, most notably Western donor-states and international 
institutions such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).10 The Obama 
administration not only continued the George W. Bush administration’s efforts to bolster 
Afghanistan’s state justice system, but dramatically increased funding to judicial 
institutions. This funding increase ignored that similar initiatives had achieved little in the 
past. Despite spending billions, decades of experience with post-conflict state-building, 
and a comprehensive review of the U.S. approach to Afghanistan, decisionmakers still 
failed to craft a policy response that accurately conceptualized the complex legal 
landscape as well as reflected the long-standing cultural and religious foundations of 
legitimate state legal order. 11  At the same time, U.S. policymakers rationalized or 
remained in denial about Hamid Karzai regime’s disinterest in promoting the rule of 
law.12 These decisions had major consequences for state-building in Afghanistan. The 
Taliban’s legal system continues to gain ground even as the Obama administration has 
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drawn to a close and President Donald Trump has taken office.13 President Trump and the 
larger international community will be forced to grapple with the challenges posed by the 
conflict in Afghanistan and by conflict-prone states worldwide, such as Syria, Libya, and 
South Sudan. 
This article argues that U.S. assistance to Afghanistan has done little to advance 
the rule of law and in certain instances has even been counterproductive.14 It fills an 
important gap in the literature by examining what was done programmatically and by 
analyzing the assumptions and theories behind those programs.15 The article also offers 
insights for current and future efforts to advance the rule of law after conflict and 
investigates whether promoting the rule of law can offer a credible avenue for 
counterinsurgency. 
U.S. engagement from the intervention in late 2001 through to the election of 
President Karzai’s successor in 2014 and the drawdown of international forces in 
Afghanistan forms a compelling case study because the shortcomings of U.S. efforts were 
real, not merely a product of the environment. Therefore, this article looks at U.S. rule-
of-law initiatives systematically over the arch of large-scale U.S. engagement. It also 
surveys the Afghan justice sector holistically through a focused, structured comparison of 
major U.S. rule-of-law programming over time.16  The research presented here draws 
upon extensive primary and secondary sources, as well as in-country fieldwork conducted 
in 2009 and 2014 along with numerous telephone interviews. It examines U.S. 
engagement with Afghanistan’s state justice sector, which has received the bulk of 
scholarly attention so far, but also with the nonstate legal systems that settle the vast 
majority of legal disputes.17 Afghanistan constitutes a crucial test case for international 
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state-building efforts as well as a rich source of “lessons learned” for policymakers.18  
The article is divided into four major sections. The first section examines the 
complex, highly pluralistic legal landscape before and during U.S. judicial state-building 
endeavors in Afghanistan. Although the state legal sector has been the primary recipient 
of U.S. assistance, most disputes in the country are still settled outside the state courts.19 
Nonstate justice is essential for understanding the overarching structure of Afghanistan’s 
legal order. The second section examines the major U.S. rule-of-law programs funded by 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and 
the Department of Defense from 2004 to 2014. The third section analyzes the strategy, 
assumptions, and theory that underpinned U.S.-funded judicial state-building projects. It 
argues that, examined comprehensively, U.S. efforts to advance the rule of law during 
both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations failed to achieve 
meaningful progress because their initiatives consistently reflected a deeply flawed set of 
assumptions. The fourth section examines the insights from U.S. efforts to promote for 
rule of law both for Afghanistan itself and for post-conflict judicial state-building more 
broadly. It highlights the need for swift action after conflict, reforms to the U.S. 
assistance oversight and implementation process, and policy approaches that address the 
justice sector holistically and maintain an overarching commitment to democracy and the 
rule of law. 
 
A Crowded Legal Landscape 
 
Afghanistan’s origin is conventionally dated to 1747. Judicial state-building had 
formed a major state priority from the late nineteenth century, but state power hinged 
upon relationships with religious and tribal authority.20 The most effective form of legal 
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order was not state law. Rather it was Pashtunwali,21 a nonstate legal code that served as 
both “an ideology and a body of common law which has evolved its own sanctions and 
institutions” implemented by Pashtuns through jirgas and shuras for non-Pashtuns.22 All 
legitimate state-sponsored legal orders in Afghan history have been grounded in a 
combination of state performance, Islam, and tribal approval. Slowly but surely, the 
central government’s state-building made progress and the country enjoyed domestic 
tranquility, albeit against a backdrop of low levels of economic development, until a 
communist coup toppled the regime in 1978, plunging the country into decades of civil 
strife under communist and then mujahideen rule. 23  Eventually the Taliban seized 
control. During the mid-1990s, the Taliban imposed a harsh, but effective state legal 
order based on religious authority with acquiescence from tribal justice authorities.24 
Although the Taliban enjoyed firm control domestically, foreign policy decisions proved 
the regime’s undoing.  Most notoriously, the Taliban regime harbored the perpetrators of 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. Shortly thereafter, a 
major international effort in support of the Northern Alliance, a preexisting domestic 
military front that opposed the regime, toppled the Taliban in late 2001. 
The Afghan people were ready for a fresh start that promised law and order coupled 
with democratic accountability. 25  From the beginning, however, the institutional 
arrangements of governance were not particularly conducive to the rule of law. Karzai 
and his allies stressed the importance of a strong, independently elected executive to 
bring order, peace, and stability—a vision institutionalized in the 2004 constitution. 
Establishing a presidential system does not necessarily preclude democratization or 
development of a state bound by the rule of law.26 Executed in accordance with the law 
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and subject to legal and democratic accountability mechanisms, concentrated state 
authority can “allow the community to deploy that power to enforce laws, keep the peace, 
defend itself against outside enemies, and provide necessary public goods.”27 Excessive 
consolidation of state power in one person, however, can facilitate authoritarianism, 
undercut democratic pluralism, and circumvent legal accountability.28   
The international community, and particularly the U.S., bears significant 
responsibility for these poor institutional choices. U.S. policymakers strongly backed 
Karzai as Afghanistan’s interim leader and then president based on the flawed 
assumption that doing so would ensure stability and smooth bilateral relations.29 They 
also agreed to deny any meaningful power for provincial governors and allowed the 
president plenary power over their appointment.30  U.S. decisionmakers acquiesced to 
Karzai’s selection of a convoluted and unrepresentative system for parliamentary 
elections that offered strong disincentives for the creation of political parties so vital for 
the representation of diverse social groups in a democratic polity.31  
After the Taliban’s collapse in late 2001, the state legal system was in shambles. 
Although there was some progress in rebuilding the justice system’s formal components, 
the Karzai regime, which was dominated by Northern Alliance warlords, did not seek to 
institutionalize the rule of law. In contrast, it behaved like a “vertically integrated 
criminal organization . . . whose core activity was not in fact exercising the functions of a 
state but rather extracting resources for personal gain.”32 The regime prevented rivals 
from seizing control of the state and its lucrative patronage networks by bending the 
Afghan state’s pliant institutions to serve their interests. In theory, state legal order was 
based on codes and legislation, and rooted in the civil law tradition. The reality was quite 
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different. Although the constitution proclaimed judicial independence, the courts were 
firmly under the executive’s control; highly susceptible to outside influences; and widely 
seen as corrupt, predatory, and rent seeking.33  
The dismal performance of Afghanistan’s state courts bolstered nonstate justice 
systems’ appeal.34 Hard data are rare, but it is estimated that 80 to 90 percent of legal 
disputes were addressed by nonstate justice systems, most often rooted in tribal law.35 
Most Afghans overwhelmingly preferred the nonstate justice offered by shuras and jirgas 
over that meted out by the new regime.36 Nonstate actors derive their authority largely 
from sources beyond the state, which often allows them to maintain a significant degree 
of autonomy.37 When powerful enough, as in Afghanistan, they can function as state-
building spoilers.38  
Although jirgas and shuras remain the default dominant forms of dispute resolution 
for many Afghans, tribal law codes, such as Pashtunwali, should not be idealized. 
Pashtunwali remains a harsh system of justice with few human rights protections.39 
Reflecting a long history of weak central rule, it relies on the legal principle of self-help 
to remedy violations. Self-enforced remedies for tribal law violations are notoriously 
difficult to extract proportionately and frequently spur further violence. Tribal law in 
Afghanistan is also systematically biased against women. As a matter of law, women are 
regulated to an intrinsically subordinate position, and forced marriage can even be used 
as compensation.40 
The post-2001 era also saw challenges to the state legal order from warlords and the 
Taliban. Both the Bonn Agreement, which outlined the parameters of the post-conflict 
transition, and the political party law, which regulated the structure of organized political 
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completion, envisioned the disarmament of warlords who had been largely suppressed by 
the Taliban. In reality, the Karzai government and international forces relied on “pro-
government or more accurately ‘anti-Taliban’ warlords to maintain order at the local and 
regional level.”41 In many cases, these were the same strongmen whose previous rule had 
sparked such widespread anger that the Taliban became a comparatively appealing 
alternative in the 1990s. Under the post-2001 regime, warlords reemerged and focused on 
structuring the political and legal order in their areas.42 Shortly thereafter, a network of 
warlords became a long-term, destructive fixture of the Afghan political scene.43  
Despite losing power in 2001, the reconstituted Taliban quickly established itself as 
the state’s fiercest judicial rival as early as 2003. Taliban justice became a centerpiece of 
a full-blown insurgency by 2006. 44  Effective legal order constituted the core of the 
Taliban’s political program, underpinned their claim to be Afghanistan’s legitimate 
rulers, and highlighted the state justice system’s failures. Taliban insurgents actively 
contended with the state legal system, especially outside the capital. The Taliban operated 
“a parallel legal system that is acknowledged by local communities as being legitimate, 
fair, free of bribery, swift, and enduring.”45 Moreover, their justice system was “easily 
one of the most popular and respected elements of the Taliban insurgency by local 
communities, especially in southern Afghanistan.”46 Taliban justice sought to provide 
what the state justice system did not: predictable, effective, legitimate, and accessible 
dispute resolution. 
In short, U.S. efforts to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan never occurred in a 
justice vacuum but rather in an ever-more crowded, highly contested and violent space. 
Efforts to promote the rule of law would have to convince a skeptical population, engage 
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with entrenched tribal justice mechanisms, and ultimately defeat armed actors overseeing 
a parallel legal system. Although certainly not impossible, this task was serious 
challenge. The U.S. policy response, however, was strikingly simplistic. 
 
Promoting the Rule of Law in Practice  
The U.S. espoused an interest in advancing the rule of law, but this goal was 
secondary to bolstering the Karzai regime, which lacked a commitment to either 
democracy or the rule of law. Karzai’s administration prioritized retaining power, 
collecting rents, and exercising authority unconstrained by legal requirements. 47  U.S. 
policymakers were so fearful that the Taliban might return to power that they were not 
prepared to meaningfully challenge the regime’s ever increasingly anti-democratic 
tendencies, corruption, and lawlessness. 
Paradoxically, despite the justice sector’s extreme dependence on foreign aid, 
international actors’ ability to promote the rule of law in Afghanistan was heavily 
circumscribed. In theory, aid dependence should increase the state’s reliance on the 
continued aid flows and, therefore, on donors. This dynamic would seem to provide 
major donors with meaningful influence over recipient state’s decisions and actions. 
Donors, however, dislike being seen as dictating state behavior.48 Program implementers 
in Afghanistan faced structural constraints that hindered their ability to promote the rule 
of law. Donors assess implementers based on their ability to execute stipulated 
programming deliverables, which almost always involves working with state institutions. 
This dynamic demands state consent regardless of whether officials are committed to 
programmatic principles. Programs that fail to execute are viewed poorly by donors and 
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endanger future contracts.49 Program implementers have strong incentives to collaborate 
with deeply corrupt states institutions, provided their leaders are willing to at least pay lip 
service to rule-of-law ideals. These problems were further compounded by Afghanistan’s 
steadily deteriorating security situation, which limited the areas and types of work that 
could be done at an acceptable level of risk.  
Even when Italy was technically the justice sector “lead nation” from 2002 to 2006, 
the United States was the most influential international actor.50 As is shown below, the 
United States funded a multitude of major initiatives through USAID, the State 
Department, and later the Defense Department totaling more than $1 billion on more than 
sixty programs.51 Not dissimilar to the broader U.S. engagement in Afghanistan, each 
agency pursued its own programmatic priorities that were not necessarily coordinated 
with other agencies’ goals or even broadly consistent.52  
 
USAID - AFGHANISTAN RULE-OF-LAW PROJECT, (2004-09) 
USAID became the first major provider of rule-of-law assistance with the creation 
of the $44 million Afghanistan Rule-of Law (AROLP) program. Checchi Consulting 
operated AROLP from October 2004 to July 2009. The initiative focused on (1.) 
“strengthening court systems and the education of legal personnel,” (2.) reforming the 
legislature, (3.) improving access to justice, and eventually (4.) engaging with the 
informal sector.  Reform of the commercial court as well as the promotion of human 
rights and women’s rights under Islam were also prioritized.53 Capacity building formed 
the cornerstone of programming. The program instructed more than 100 judges as well as 
approximately 60 law professors and 100 university administrators.54 AROLP produced 
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legal materials and sought to improve the courts’ administrative capacities. As with the 
vast majority of rule of law assistance, it was highly technocratic and state-centric. In its 
later years, as state-focused initiatives were already beginning to fall short of 
expectations, AROLP displayed some interest in the nonstate justice sector. Programmers 
believed that “the linkage between the formal and informal justice sectors [is] essential to 
improving the rule of law in Afghanistan.”55 AROLP sponsored research on nonstate 
justice and tried to increase citizens’ awareness of the state justice system along with 
“their legal rights and responsibilities under the Constitution of Afghanistan.”56 AROLP 
also advocated for “a national policy on state relations with informal justice 
mechanisms.”57 
While AROLP worked with various justice-sector institutions, the Supreme Court 
was its most important partner. The Supreme Court’s consent was essential for most 
programming, but the judiciary was not independent in practice.58 As a result, Supreme 
Courts judges had little incentive or ability to foster the rule of law, particularly if it 
involved challenging executive power. The Supreme Court consistently upheld executive 
authority regardless of how dubious the exercise of that power, including in conflicts over 
the scope of executive power, election administration, and the removal of presidential 
appointees.59 AROLP did little to address structural problems in the Afghan justice sector 
or constructively engage the nonstate sector. This dynamic is evident based on its chosen 
evaluation criteria: (1.) Creation of a “national policy on the informal justice sector” and 
(2.) Usage of state courts as reflected in survey results.60 A nonstate justice policy was 
developed by domestic and international actors, marking the first official recognition of 
nonstate justice authorities. Despite formal agreement at the ministerial level, the policy 
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did not reflect a real consensus because it relied on ambiguous language to paper over 
major differences and did not involve any serious engagement with nonstate judicial 
actors.  
The second evaluation criterion was equally problematic. First, projects were 
predicated on the simplistic and inaccurate belief common to rule-of-law programs that 
informing people about the state courts and their rights will improve the rule of law.61 
Second, the program sought to channel people to state courts regardless of the 
consequences. Courts were initially underresourced, both financially and in terms of 
human resources. They were also slow, expensive, and possessed limited enforcement 
capacity. Worse, they were often corrupt, predatory, and rent seeking.62 It made little 
sense to channel cases into the state justice system regardless of the quality and capacity 
of its courts. The first major USAID rule-of-law program did next to nothing to advance 
the rule of law.  
 
USAID RULE-OF-LAW SUCCESSOR PROGRAMS, (2010-14) 
 
By 2009, promoting a just, viable legal order was increasingly seen as a potent 
weapon in the fight against an increasingly powerful Taliban insurgency that drew 
strength from the Afghan state’s immense corruption.63 USAID funded two related rule-
of-law programs. Rule of Law Stabilization-Formal Component (RLS-Formal) sought to 
“develop[] a justice system that is both effective and enjoys wide respect among Afghan 
citizens is critical to stabilizing democracy and bringing peace.” 64  Rule of Law 
Stabilization-Informal Component (RLS-Informal) shared a similar premise as it aimed 
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“to ‘promote and support the informal justice system in key post-conflict areas’ as a way 
of improving stabilization.”65  
Despite AROLP’s inability to advance the rule of law, international development 
contractor Tetra Tech DPK was chosen to implement a successor program, RLS-Formal 
from May 2010 to September 2014 at a cost of more than $47,500,000. The program’s 
goals were strikingly similar to AROLP. RLS-Formal emphasized “capacity building” of 
judicial actors and administrators as well as improving legal education and raising 
“public awareness of legal rights and the broader legal system.”66 RLS-Formal supported 
extensive training and technical assistance along with the development of educational 
materials and strategic plans. There were also public information campaigns and attempts 
to strengthen public outreach capacity of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice. 
Most participants viewed the trainings positively, 67  but RLS-Formal faced chronic 
difficulties. The program emphasized “improve[ing] the public image and use of the 
formal judiciary,”68 but improving public perception risked enabling rent seeking rather 
than improving the judiciary. RLS-Formal ignored structural issues with the underlying 
political economy of the Afghan justice system, including the lack of judicial 
independence and endemic corruption. As before, public service announcements 
encouraging more people to use a highly corrupt justice system did little to improve the 
rule of law and threatened to further undermine Afghans’ faith in the judicial system. 
Programming, again, depended on consent from the institutional actors responsible 
for many of these problems. These intuitional actors had little incentive to facilitate 
changes that threatened the larger political and legal order. Tetra Tech’s final report is 
strikingly forthright. After noting major challenges with corruption and “weak political 
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support for rule of law reforms,” the report explains “The most difficult barriers to 
overcome during project implementation, and the barriers that threaten the sustainability 
of project initiatives, are a lack of willingness among counterpart institutions to support 
and adopt reforms, and a failure to allocate sufficient funds to maintain quality trainings 
for current and future justice sector personnel. Leadership at counterpart institutions 
continues to demonstrate a lack of commitment to justice sector reforms by delaying the 
approval of tools and technologies that will increase the efficiency and transparency of 
courts.”69 
The Supreme Court was particularly problematic because it received and oversaw 
external aid but lacked a commitment to the rule of law. Frequently, “when the Supreme 
Court was asked to approve new initiatives or reforms, the institution tended to make 
approval contingent on future events that never happened.”70 Tetra Tech determined that 
the Supreme Court’s attitude reflected a clear “reluctance to embrace new processes and 
procedures that increase the efficiency, transparency, accountability, and fairness in the 
justice sector.”71 Thus, RLS-Formal initiatives had little prospect for sustainability or 
fostering meaningful institutional change.  
Although Tetra Tech implemented the program, USAID deserves the most strident 
criticism. It designed the program and continually displayed almost willful blindness to 
political reality. As the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) notes, “USAID nearly doubled funding, even though it knew 
the Afghan Supreme Court was not interested in funding or otherwise sustaining those 
activities.”72 Programming never meaningfully engaged with the long-standing pillars of 
legitimacy in Afghanistan: religion, cultural norms, and provision of public goods. 
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Instead, the focus was on public relations. RLS-Formal sought to improve the judiciary’s 
image based on the mistaken idea that the potential users lacked sufficient information 
about state courts, but Afghans already recognized that courts were not credible dispute 
resolution forums. Neither judicial performance nor public perception of the judiciary 
improved.73 Avoidance of the courts was entirely rational. Even if the quality of justice 
had improved through training or administrative reform, nothing in the program 
addressed the judicial system’s inability to enforce its judgments or prevent outside 
interference. 
By 2010, policymakers increasingly viewed nonstate justice as a more productive 
avenue for international engagement. This belief was the animating idea behind RLS-
Informal. The nearly $40 million Checchi-administered RLS-Informal program operated 
from 2010 to 2014. RLS-Informal emphasized “access to fair, transparent, and 
accountable justice for men, women, and children by (1) improving and strengthening the 
traditional dispute resolution system, (2) bolstering collaboration between the informal 
and formal justice systems, and (3) supporting cooperation for the resolution of 
longstanding disputes.”74  It sought to improve the quality of nonstate justice and to 
strengthen linkages between the state and nonstate justice systems. The program’s more 
pressing goal, however, was to supplement and consolidate U.S.-led counterinsurgency 
efforts. RLS-Informal envisioned filling the supposed “justice vacuum” in territories that 
had “been ‘cleared and held’ by the military and the Taliban ‘courts’ removed.” 75 
Localized nonstate justice mechanisms were to be strengthened, or in some instances 
created, to prevent “‘teetering’ areas from reverting back to Taliban justice and 
influence.”76 RLS-Informal engaged with nonstate judicial actors in targeted areas. Yet, 
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the program largely echoed work done for state actors and drew on the same highly 
suspect template. Capacity building was a major focus for elders and other informal-
justice actors. Trainings addressed state and Sharia law as well as administrative 
processes. Beyond training, RLS-Informal sought to “encourag[e] women’s participation 
in TDR [traditional dispute resolution] processes, implement[] a program of public 
outreach, and build[] networks of elders.”77  
RLS-Informal attempted to engage with the long-standing pillars of legal 
legitimacy by working within the tribal system. It sought to capitalize on the perceived 
desire of many local actors to increase their social standing through greater knowledge of 
Islam (and to a lesser extent state law), and the ability to access international assistance to 
bolster their status in the community. 78 From the donors’ perspective, this dynamic could 
allow them to more effectively provide order. The external evaluation does identify some 
modest changes in response to outside assistance,79 but local justice actors certainly did 
not change their approach to state justice. Although RLS-Informal sought to increase 
linkages between state and nonstate justice, the flow was one directional. More cases 
were referred to the nonstate system, but referrals to state courts did not increase.80 This 
dynamic reflects the citizenry’s continued low regard for state courts. 
Strengthening nonstate justice raised even more logistical issues than the state 
system. A judge may be corrupt or unwilling to engage program implementers, but at 
least it is clear who is and is not a judge. When engaging tribal or religious authorities, 
participant selection was an inherently fraught process. Program staff genuinely 
attempted to understand each locality. Nevertheless, grasping local dynamics and how 
international assistance would subsequently influence communal relations far exceeded 
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their technical capacity. Although reports cast local participants as motivated solely by a 
desire to help the broader community, often they were more motivated by international 
assistance’s ability to enhance their influence.81 Equally troubling, the program lacked a 
clear, coherent approach for navigating the tensions between state law, including 
international human rights norms, and Sharia law. Program decisions were inevitably 
somewhat ad hoc and based on short-term calculations. While RLS-Informal reflected 
some knowledge of local realities, insurgents almost invariably knew areas better. 
International intervention occasionally even made local tensions worse and resolution of 
long-standing disputes more difficult.82  
Counterinsurgency was the U.S. government’s top priority. RLS-Informal 
envisioned strengthening the nonstate justice sector to undercut the Taliban’s justice 
system. Simple enough in theory, but it proved deeply challenging and often 
counterproductive. First, RLS-Informal laid the groundwork for counterinsurgency 
efforts on the shaky foundation of the local authorities most willing to collaborate with 
the U.S. rather than the most influential religious and tribal authorities. Therefore, 
program achievements inherently depended on outside support and quickly evaporated 
once international support was gone. Second, RLS-Informal’s short-term approach 
generated pressure for quick wins and demonstrable metrics, but even these were often in 
short supply.83  Third, the approach assumed a nonexistent justice vacuum were new 
dispute-resolution efforts could thrive. If there were truly a void, then RLS-Informal’s 
efforts to strengthen or create new nonstate dispute resolution mechanisms would have 
made sense. In reality, tribal structure, warlords, or the Taliban underpinned order at the 
local level. RLS-Informal’s favored local representatives were often not the most 
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prominent community members. Whatever authority these individuals had largely 
reflected international assistance rather than local standing. Shuras set up by international 
actors could be destabilizing by distributing large amounts of external funding as well as 
empowering individuals through military force that may not enjoy substantial popular 
support. Interviewers who worked on internationally funded nonstate justice programs 
even suggested that it was not uncommon for individuals with access to international 
support using aid and the threat of U.S. military force to pursue personal agendas and 
vendettas. 84 
RLS-Informal failed to understand that providing an alternative justice venue alone 
was insufficient to counter the Taliban. In many cases, Taliban justice was comparatively 
well regarded, particularly in the Pashtun heartland.85 The Taliban actively sought to 
prevent local communities from using state courts or U.S.-backed dispute resolution 
forums. Taliban issued “night letters” threatening to kill all individuals and the entire 
families of those who collaborated with the international programs or the Afghan 
government. Where villages were under the protection of international military forces, 
the Taliban promised to retaliate once those troops left.” 86  RLS-Informal could not 
counter the Taliban’s credible threats of immediate and long-term violence.  
 
USAID INITIATIVES: IMPLEMENTATION VERSUS PROGRAM DESIGN 
 
Thus far this section has criticized program implementation, but these issues 
reflect more fundamental problems with USAID management and oversight. Invariably, 
USAID sought to control defining the scope and content of projects as well as their 
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implementation. This tendency to micromanage was reflected in contracts that 
“specif[ied] precisely what the U.S. contracting partners are to do at every step of the 
way throughout a project.”87 The level of centralized control in the Afghanistan contracts 
was stunning, particularly given the fluidity of the situation and the need for a nuanced, 
localized approach when trying to engage local communities. In addition to USAID’s 
inherent contractual power to modify programming, Tetra Tech and Checchi were 
required to submit elaborate performance-monitoring plans for approval. USAID’s drive 
toward ever-greater quantification and control stemmed largely from the need to establish 
to the U.S. Congress exactly how funding was spent and what had been achieved. Yet 
USAID increasingly micromanaged programs even as its in-house capacities had been 
largely “hollowed out.”88  This vicious cycle was particularly evident in Afghanistan 
because the extensive demands of contracting generated a general shortage of qualified 
contractors.  
 
STATE DEPARTMENT JUSTICE-SECTOR SUPPORT PROGRAM, (2005-14) 
 
The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) served as the lead agency tasked with coordinating U.S. rule-
of-law assistance in Afghanistan. Largely implemented by Pacific Architects and 
Engineers (PAE), the State Department Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) was the 
“primary capacity building vehicle” for judicial state-building. 89  The JSSP reflected 
grand ambitions with $241 million in expenditures from 2005 to 2014. It was the largest 
single rule-of-law program in Afghanistan. JSSP featured three major components. 
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Component one focused on trainings for regional justice-sector officials, such as judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Component two concentrated on establishing a case 
management system. The third component emphasized building the administrative and 
technical capacity of relevant ministries.90 
The JSSP offered training, capacity building, and technical assistance to the 
Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the 
Interior Ministry, the Independent National Legal Training Center, and the Supreme 
Court. Staff numbers were significant. In 2011, for example, the JSSP employed “93 
Afghan legal experts, 65 American advisors, and over 100 Afghan support staff.”91 
Training was undertaken on a massive scale with “a grand total of over 300 JSSP courses 
training over 13,500 students.”92 Training occurred in all thirty-four provinces for judges, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other legal personnel. By the end of 2014, the JSSP 
had developed and implemented a comprehensive case-management system active in 
eighteen provinces featuring data on 104,000 cases.93 The program provided assistance 
with legislative drafting and law implementation. It also created new institutions, notably 
the Attorney General’s Anti-Corruption Unit, the Afghanistan Independent Bar 
Association, and the Ministry of Justice’s Planning Directorate.  
Despite the JSSP’s broad reach and substantial funding, at its core the JSSP was a 
straightforward judicial capacity building program that invested heavily in the state 
justice sector. Although larger in scope, both the means and ends of the JSSP were 
strikingly similar to those of USAID’s AROLP and RLS-Formal programs. In terms of 
results, comprehensive audits of the JSSP have shown no demonstrable evidence that the 
program advanced the rule of law or even met its own programmatic objectives.94 Despite 
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extensive training, no key justice-sector institutions displayed a meaningful commitment 
to uniform application of the law or a willingness to follow it. New laws were passed but 
were not consistently enforced. All major justice-sector institutions remained firmly 
under the control of “one of the most corrupt regimes on the planet.” 95  The State 
Department cast the Afghan state’s failure to address corruption as a failure of “political 
will” rather recognizing that systematic corruption was the system itself. The JSSP 
consistently faced major management, oversight, and implementation issues, including a 
series of “poorly designed deliverables,” which in turn led to the actual deliverables 
produced being “useless.”96   
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RULE-OF-LAW FIELD FORCE-AFGHANISTAN, 
(2010-14) 
 
The U.S. military became directly involved in efforts to promote the rule of law in 
Afghanistan through the Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan (ROLFF-A) initiative 
under the auspices of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435. ROLFF-A 
operated from September 2010 to February 2014. The Department of Defense spent 
approximately $24 million subsidizing the state justice sector. ROLFF-A sought to 
“provide essential field capabilities and security to Afghan, coalition and civil-military 
rule of law project teams in non-permissive areas, in order to build Afghan criminal 
justice capacity and promote the legitimacy of the Afghan government.”97 The program 
sought to (1.) enhance human resources, (2.) construct justice infrastructure, (3.) increase 
public awareness and access to state courts, and (4.) improve physical security for judges 
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and other judicial actors in ten provinces.98  
Apart from the fourth priority, ROLFF-A’s objectives were decidedly conventional. 
ROLFF-A attempted to strengthen the state justice system by working primarily with the 
Supreme Court, the Ministries of Justice and Interior, and the High Office of Oversight 
for Anti-Corruption. The program proclaimed neutrality regarding nonstate justice, 
“provided that dispute resolution is not administered by the Taliban or other insurgent 
groups.”99 Although the national government had yet to formalize its relationship with 
nonstate justice actors, the program sought to engage “Afghan Justice Sector actors to 
build linkages between the two systems.”100 
ROLFF-A was fully integrated within larger stability and counterinsurgency efforts 
that stressed “establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state.” 101  As the 
program’s commander, Brig. Gen. Mark Martin, explained, ROLFF-A sought to 
“establish rule-of-law green zones.” 102  Over time a “hub-and-spoke linkage between 
green zones in key provinces and districts” would emerge, which in turn would help 
“create a system of justice at the subnational level.”103 In other words, the rule of law was 
conceptualized as a cornerstone of broader efforts to build the state from the bottom up, 
while failing to acknowledge just how ambitious, optimistic, and ahistorical this belief 
was. After all, why would nonstate actors suddenly embrace the state legal system that 
showed no sign of improving and at the cost of potential insurgent retaliation? The U.S. 
military interventions never grappled with the fact that a hub-and-spoke system made 
little sense if the state justice sector failed to simultaneously improve. Furthermore, as the 
rule of law takes decades to establish even under favorable circumstances, it was naïve to 
believe that it could be instituted through a short-term surge in forces.104  
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ROLFF-A faced a multitude of serious issues. Its programming incorrectly assumed 
that stabilization and rule-of-law programming were functional equivalents. As with the 
RLS-Informal initiative, ROLFF-A sought to build stability on quick wins and 
demonstrable outputs to fill a nonexistent justice vacuum. The program’s approach was at 
odds with a legal landscape defined by ongoing, fierce combat and its achievements 
remain speculative. The Defense Department still does not know how much money was 
spent.105  Ironically for a military initiative, insecurity undermined the program. U.S. 
military forces generally could not protect against Taliban attacks in the short term, let 
alone once programming ceased. The mere presence of the military could incite violence 
as local actors scrambled to acquire external resources. 
The overt militarization of rule-of-law assistance and its use in counterinsurgency 
generated additional problems. First, the assumptions underpinning counterinsurgency 
operations were dubious. There is a “surprisingly weak evidence base for the 
effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives” in Afghanistan 
and more generally.106 The strategy reflected a unilateral decision by U.S. policymakers 
rather than a cooperative strategy with the Afghan regime. 107  Afghan government 
officials desired military support to defeat the Taliban but were decidedly disinterested in 
furthering legal reform.  
Second, the program reflected some notable misunderstandings and misperceptions. 
The Department of Defense consistently stressed that the nonstate actors it engaged were 
authentic, traditional, and organic. In reality, “authority over life and death was 
simultaneously located in other institutions and actors, namely external interveners” 
rather than nonstate justice actors, who largely depended on external forces for their 
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authority.108  Moreover, the enforcement of “rule of law green zones” hub-and-spoke 
system relied on the prospect of external force. State courts had little ability to implement 
their rulings. Even more troubling, the thoroughly corrupt, deeply compromised state 
judicial institutions could not provide stability. Even if all areas were cleared and every 
insurgent defeated, the state would still lack a legitimate legal order. There was no hub to 
build spokes around. ROLFF-A starkly highlights external actors’ limited capacity to 
advance the rule of law even when overtly backed by military force. Even in the best of 
circumstances, establishing the rule of law takes time. Thus, a rule-of-law green zone 
means little unless it exists for years and is linked to powerful domestic constituencies 
committed to the rule of law. 
 
PROGRAMMATIC PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 
Although the programs detailed above achieved a few tactical gains and helped 
build some state judicial infrastructure, no U.S. program meaningfully advanced the rule 
of law in Afghanistan. Each faced significant challenges in a complex, legally pluralist 
environment with serious security concerns. The biggest problem, however, was that key 
state actors were not committed to the rule of law, and there was little real demand for the 
assistance. Without high-level state efforts to reduce corruption, improve judicial 
performance, and engage constructively with nonstate tribal and religious actors, judicial 
state-building assistance would always achieve little regardless of expenditure or program 
design. Indeed, when efforts were made to “investigat[e] corruption, they were rebuked 
by Karzai’s officials for misunderstanding the nature of patronage networks that served to 
support the government.”109 Yet, U.S. policymakers chose to keep investing in efforts 
25 
 
they knew were not working. Policymakers, donors, and implementers embraced wildly 
optimistic assumptions to rationalize the perpetuation of failing programs and policies. 
U.S. decisionmakers made clear policy and programmatic choices that had profound 
consequences.  
 
Conceptualizing International Judicial State-Building in Afghanistan 
When the Taliban regime collapsed, the legal system displayed a high degree of 
legal pluralism. Yet, most disputes were still settled based on tribal codes. Initial security 
arrangements outside the capital were predicated on alliances between the state and 
armed strongmen. U.S. assistance reflected the optimistic and ultimately unrealistic idea 
that these tacit alliances would become less necessary as state courts gained capacity and 
authority. While aid focused on bolstering state justice-sector institutions for more than 
half a decade during the Bush administration, Obama administration policymakers 
subsequently determined that subsidization alone was insufficient.  
In 2009, the United States’ policy rhetoric began to shift, but its initiatives 
remained focused around a litany of highly repetitive trainings and capacity-building 
projects. Policy reflected a combination of political expediency and security concerns that 
bore little resemblance to the grandiose claims about ensuring the rule of law and 
promoting access to justice for ordinary Afghans. The U.S. consistently revamped its 
official approach. Still, as highlighted above, improvement always remained elusive. Yet 
while programs were problematic, the overarching issue was strategy and the attempt to 
build the rule of law in partnership with a regime that was certainly interested in passing 
regulations for society at large but had no interest in being bound by the law itself, ending 
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impunity, or promoting the rule of law. After all, “even the most formal, minimalist 
conception of the rule of law requires a normative commitment to the project of the rule 
of law” by state officials at the highest level.110 Overall, the Karzai regime did not view 
itself as bound by its law and or view the law as a meaningful restraint on its behavior. 
 
STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING THE NONSTATE JUSTICE SECTOR 
 
The previous section highlighted the most important programmatic initiatives 
undertaken with a goal of advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan. This section focuses 
on the overarching strategies employed by U.S. policymakers to further this objective. 
Even if unstated, there are five main strategies for conceptualizing engagement between 
the state and nonstate systems in highly legally pluralist settings such as Afghanistan: (1.) 
Bridging, (2.) Harmonization, (3.) Incorporation, (4.) Subsidization, and (5.) Repression. 
These strategies are conceptually distinct though by no means mutually exclusive or 
hermetically sealed in practice.  
Success can never be guaranteed by strategy alone, but certain environments favor 
certain strategies. Bridging approaches aim to allocate cases between the state and 
nonstate justice systems as appropriate given relevant state law and participant 
preferences. Harmonization seeks to transform nonstate justice principles and outputs to 
be consistent with the state system’s stated core values in key areas, most frequently, 
nonstate actors’ treatment of women.111 Under incorporation, nonstate justice becomes 
state justice as those venues are placed under the authority of state actors. Incorporation 
can take the form of religious or customary courts or the designation of nonstate justice 
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actors as courts of first instance. Alternatively, decisions from the nonstate system could 
be tentative subject to appeal or ratification by state officials. Subsidization seeks to 
increase the capacity, performance, and popularity of state justice. It can take a variety of 
forms. Certain core techniques, nevertheless, recur across settings, most notably 
legislative reform, capacity building, physical infrastructure construction, supporting 
symbolic representation, and increased public engagement. In contrast, repression aims to 
eliminate the state’s judicial rivals.  When the state is strong enough, this can take the 
form of simply prohibiting nonstate justice forums. Almost invariably, however, 
repression entails significant violence. Repression can be essential when the state faces 
an existential threat from nonstate justice actors, particularly when linked to an armed 
insurgency, but it is invariably fraught with risks of reciprocal violence.  
 
SUBSIDIZATION STRATEGY, 2002-08 
Once U.S. rule-of-law promotion efforts in Afghanistan began in earnest in 2005, 
they focused overwhelmingly on subsidization. The vast majority of the country’s 
judicial infrastructure had been destroyed during the conflict. Qualified legal 
professionals were scarce, and their training needs were daunting. 112  International 
assistance was a prerequisite for enabling most justice-sector organizations to function at 
all.  Subsidization thus reflected a clear, compelling rationale: the state justice sector 
desperately needed improved human resources, training, supplies, and infrastructure. 
International aid was focused on building modern state institutions that acted in 
accordance with the rule of law.  The subsidization approach was deeply embedded in 
nearly all judicial state-building efforts. The 2005-10 USAID-Afghanistan Mission’s 
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strategic objectives explicitly endorsed subsidization. It focused upon “build[ing] 
capacity of the formal justice sector” by (1) “decreas[ing] obstacles to citizens accessing 
the formal justice sector”; (2) “increas[ing] professionalism of judicial sector personnel”; 
and (3) “strengthen[ing] the institutional capacity for lawmaking and technical 
drafting.”113 
The initial international efforts faced substantial criticism for allocating insufficient 
resources to state reconstruction.114 Yet, Afghanistan received an immense amount of 
support relative to other contemporary peacebuilding missions, and its aid absorptive 
capacity was limited.115 Merely increasing assistance does not guarantee improvement 
and often produces significant negative externalities. The rule of law takes decades to 
establish, and there is no area where more rule-of-law assistance would have clearly 
translated into better quality of justice or a state more committed to the rule of law.  
Subsidization achieved little given its slow start, state disinterest, and poor strategic 
choices. These choices included failing to establish nationwide security during a period 
of relative calm, outsourcing security to warlords, and allowing consolidation of authority 
in the executive and a culture of corruption to flourish.116 State officials generally cared 
little for U.S.-backed legal modernization plans. Moreover, the programmatic initiatives 
were decidedly uninspired. Assistance to Afghanistan exemplified a “breathtakingly 
mechanistic approach to rule-of-law development” focused on replicating “institutional 
endpoints” – an approach that has been widely discredited.117 The pattern described by 
Thomas Carothers neatly captures Afghanistan’s situation where programmers assessed 
“in what ways selected institutions do not resemble their counterparts in countries that 
donors believe embody successful rule of law—and then attempting to modify or reshape 
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those institutions to fit the desired model. If a court lacks access to legal materials, then 
those legal materials should be provided. If case management in the courts is 
dysfunctional, it should be brought up to Western standards. If a criminal procedure law 
lacks adequate protections for detainees, it should be rewritten. The basic idea is that if 
the institutions can be changed to fit the models, the rule of law will emerge.”118 Outside 
investments in the state justice sector, however, produced no discernible progress towards 
the rule of law in Afghanistan. 
In 2006, international actors began to express growing interest in Afghanistan’s 
nonstate justice sector. Policy suggestions included bridging by the creation of mutually 
constitutive institutional links between state and nonstate dispute resolution mechanisms, 
harmonization through attempts to ensure that nonstate dispute resolution forums act in a 
manner consistent with state law, and incorporation efforts to establish some sort of 
overarching system where jirgas and shuras would function akin to courts of first 
instance. 119  Although it was a growing area of interest intellectually, programming 
largely left the nonstate justice sector untouched throughout the Bush administration.  
 
A Road Not Taken 
By far the most thoughtful and compelling attempt to constructively engage with 
nonstate justice was not a U.S. initiative at all. Rather it was a major 2007 UNDP report, 
Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. The report 
forcefully advocated for a “hybrid model of Afghan justice” that would include “the 
creation of cost-effective ADR [alternative dispute resolution] and Human Rights Units 
alongside the state justice system. ADR Units would be responsible for selecting 
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appropriate mechanisms to settle disputes outside the courtroom. This would include 
jirgas/shuras, Community Development Councils, and other civil society organizations. 
ADR mechanisms would handle minor criminal incidents and civil cases, while giving 
people a choice to have their cases heard at the nearest state court. All serious criminal 
cases would fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the formal justice system. When 
ADR decisions are not satisfactory to the disputants, they can be taken back to the 
formal, state justice system.”120 The report, however, provoked “an angry and threatening 
response from Afghan judicial and state justice institutions.”121 Given the opposition of 
key Afghan political and legal elites, it is no surprise that the hybrid model never became 
official U.S. policy.  
Yet, the report nonetheless proved influential. Ideas from the UNDP report were 
selectively harnessed by policymakers for numerous initiatives, including a series of U.S. 
funded pilot programs, the Defense Department backed projects that used nonstate justice 
mechanisms for counter insurgency discussed above, and the flawed 2010 “Draft Law on 
Dispute Resolution Shura and Jirga.”122 Each initiative, however, fell short of its goals.123 
The report offered a coherent policy vision, but to be implemented, let alone work 
effectively, the proposed hybrid model required strong support from the Afghan justice 
sector and the regime more generally. There would need to be a serious commitment to 
building a more constructive relationship between state and nonstate justice actors as well 
as a broader commitment to reducing corruption and ending impunity. Absent these 
fundamental shifts, the hybrid model never really had a chance to succeed. 
 
A COMPREHENSIVE, BUT INCHOATE APPROACH, 2009-14  
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President Obama pledged to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the Afghan state 
while avoiding an open-ended military commitment. Nearly all U.S. aid, including rule-
of-law assistance, emphasized these objectives. The top U.S. military commander in 
Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, argued that effective counterinsurgency involved 
bolstering the quality and access to both state and nonstate justice mechanisms “that offer 
swift and fair resolution of disputes, particularly at the local level” to disrupt the Taliban 
and their justice system. 124  To achieve these goals, McChrystal believed that the 
international community had to “work with GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan] to develop a clear mandate and boundaries for local informal justice 
systems.”125 
After a comprehensive policy review, Obama ordered an “Afghanistan surge” 
modeled on similar efforts to stabilize Iraq against insurgent advances. The president 
authorized 30,000 additional ground troops to stabilize the country, but these forces 
would begin to be withdrawn after eighteen months. Obama likewise dramatically 
increased civilian engagement efforts, including initiatives to promote the rule of law. In 
addition to a vast increase in funds, the administration roughly “tripled the total U.S. 
government civilian presence in Afghanistan from 300 to 1,000, overseeing additional 
thousands of contracted civilian implementing partners.”126 It also drastically increased 
subsidization of the state justice sector. Even after the drawdown, funding levels for rule-
of-law programs remained well above pre-2009 levels. The administration demonstrated 
a willingness to try any strategy that might help defeat the Taliban insurgency, however 
implausible. Despite mounting evidence to contrary, the U.S. remained wedded to the 
“vacuum” theory of judicial state-building as a foundation of the U.S. government’s rule-
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of-law assistance approach. For instance, the 2010 “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional 
Stabilization Strategy” emphasized “Justice and rule of law programs will focus on 
creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that 
the Taliban have exploited with their own brutal form of justice.127  
The U.S. strategy was largely agonistic whether Afghans sought, justice provided 
they eschewed Taliban courts. This approach to nonstate justice displayed admirable 
pragmatism compared to earlier efforts that emphasized replicating a Western-style 
judiciary. Yet, this agnostic approach was undermined because programs addressing the 
state justice system were still trying to do exactly that. With so many moving, highly 
contingent, and largely uncoordinated parts, the strategic end point was never clear. U.S. 
policymakers viewed nonstate justice mechanisms as instrumentally important to their 
overarching goals of counterinsurgency and stabilization. There was never a serious 
attempt, however, to engage with the three main pillars of legitimacy: cultural affinity, 
Islam, and provision of public goods, including forums for fair and equitable dispute 
resolution.  
 
SIMULTANEOUS JUDICIAL STATE-BUILDING STRATEGIES 
The Obama administration’s transformative plans for Afghanistan were 
crystallized in the unified civil-military U.S. Foreign Assistance plan for 2011 to 2015.128 
The report explains “The principal focus of the U.S. rule of law effort is to reverse the 
public perception of GIRoA as weak or predatory by helping the Afghan government and 
local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms 
that offer an alternative to the Taliban shadow justice system. Assistance will be provided 
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in support of Afghan efforts to strengthen the formal state justice system, stabilize the 
traditional justice system, and build a safe, secure, and humane civilian corrections 
system.”129  
Informal justice was explicitly linked to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. 
wanted to collaborate with preexisting nonstate actors but also “re-establish[] traditional 
dispute mechanisms” as part of broader efforts to counter the Taliban’s parallel justice 
system.130 The U.S. created nonstate dispute resolution forums albeit ones without the 
long-standing cultural and religious roots. This endeavor involved local research on 
nonstate systems and how they could be utilized to defeat the Taliban. Thus, each 
strategy ostensibly promoted goals in the legal sector, but primarily to support 
counterinsurgency efforts.  
As examined below, U.S. assistance was expanded and diversified to include 
various strategies and engagement with both state and nonstate justice actors. It did not, 
however, produce the desired results. Behind the transformative rhetoric, the United 
States’ bold vision for rule-of-law assistance was underpinned by wildly optimistic 
“critical assumptions”: “(1.) The Afghan government will implement its reinvigorated 
plans to fight corruption, with measures of progress toward greater accountability. (2.) 
Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute 
resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited. (3.) USG 
[U.S. government] programs will successfully address local officials’ lack of education, 
experience, and limited resources. (4.) GIRoA action will counter obstruction from local 
powerbrokers whose activities are sometimes inconsistent with the Afghan 
constitution.”131 
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Each of these assumptions was clearly unrealistic. The Karzai administration never 
sought to eliminate state corruption. The justice system displayed few signs of 
improvement, lacked a commitment to the rule of law, and remained subject to executive 
influence. As evidenced by the serious challenges faced by well-funded U.S. programs 
aimed at Afghan state institutions that placed a major emphasis on capacity building, 
resource restraints and lack of knowledge were rarely the reason rule-of-law initiatives 
underperformed. Moreover, the Karzai regime and the U.S. government were in league 
with powerbrokers who actively opposed to advancing the rule of law. Although they 
found warlords unsavory, U.S. policymakers partnered with them to try to defeat the 
Taliban, and there was never a serious attempt at disarmament. Afghanistan’s rule-of-law 
situation saw very little improvement by the time Afghans elected a new president in 
2014, in a process marked by even greater fraud and controversy than the 2009 elections.  
 
SUBSIDIZATION. In 2009, the U.S. government renewed its pledge to “support 
capacity development of the formal state courts.”132  The new strategy’s core was, in 
reality, a super-sized reincarnation of the preexisting subsidization strategy. For example, 
funding from the State Department INL Bureau for rule-of-law assistance in Afghanistan 
ballooned from $26.5 million in 2006 to $328 million in 2010.133 Yet, massive funding 
increases failed to transform the Afghan justice sector or even produce notable 
improvements. Instead, they demonstrated the limits of what subsidization could achieve 
absent an ideological commitment by the state to the rule of law. The Karzai regime was 
hostile toward efforts to strengthen the rule of law, which could undermine both its 
freedom of action and its patronage system. The Supreme Court and other key judicial 
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organs were open to receiving aid, but only on their terms and never in a way that 
ultimately threatened the overarching system. 
HARMONIZATION. A harmonization push sought to make the nonstate justice 
system in Afghanistan operate on principles akin to the state system or, more accurately, 
on an idealized conceptualization of state justice that protects human rights and upholds 
the rule of law. It involved both supply- and demand-side activities. On the supply- side, 
“tribal elders/religious leaders who conduct shuras would receive training on relevant 
state and religious law.”134 On the demand- side, U.S. assistance would increase Afghan’s 
awareness regarding their legal rights and how to assert them. Assistance would thus help 
align the behavior of state and nonstate actors, and bolster nonstate actors’ willingness to 
support the state. There is little to suggest that U.S. initiatives caused Afghans to view 
state law more favorably or nonstate justice mechanisms to operate more procedurally or 
substantively like state courts. Neither was there any increase in the “enforcement of the 
rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups.”135 Harmonization failed 
because nonstate justice actors largely remained wary of state courts, and human rights 
concerns proved readily expendable when they were seen as clashing with security and 
counterinsurgency goals. 
 
BRIDGING. Bridging between the state and nonstate justice sectors in Afghanistan 
became a more prominent strategy after 2009. The U.S. sought to “establish[] linkages, as 
appropriate, between the informal and state systems.”136 This strategy envisioned citizens 
enjoying free access to both systems as appropriate predicated on a sensible jurisdictional 
divide. For example, whereas a judge may refer a property theft to a local jirga, state 
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courts would retain exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes such as murder.  In reality, 
however, the state lacked the capacity to compel most nonstate justice actors to use state 
courts. The quality of state justice remained poor; thus there was no demand. RLS-
Informal witnessed no discernible increase in popular demand for state courts. 137 
Although aid likely increased public awareness and perhaps even access, it was a 
proverbial bridge to nowhere as the public demand for state justice remained sparse.  
 
INCORPORATION. Incorporation envisioned a partnership among U.S rule of law 
program implementers, the Afghan Ministry of Justice, and other relevant agencies “to 
formalize links between the two systems [state and nonstate justice] to maximize the 
benefits of both systems and to reduce the weaknesses.”138 These ambitious ideals were 
prominent in the 2009 draft nonstate justice policy. The policy was promoted and signed 
by various state representatives and international backers.  Although it recognized the 
potential benefits of nonstate justice, the policy demanded that “informal dispute 
resolution decisions need to be consistent with Shariah, the Constitution, other Afghan 
laws and international human rights standards.”139 The policy consensus was shallow, 
however. There was minimal consultation with tribal nonstate justice actors, and no clear 
vision existed as to how to address the de facto authority of warlords in the areas they 
controlled. 
The September 2010 “Draft Law on Dispute Resolution Shuras and Jirgas” 
imagined nonstate justice actors as part of the state system. Consequently, it heavily 
regulated their jurisdiction, operations, and decisionmaking as well as their relationship 
to state courts.140 As such, the draft law included harmonization and bridging elements 
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alongside incorporation.  The law staunchly asserted the state’s authority to control and 
regulate all aspects of nonstate dispute resolution. The law stipulated that jirga 
participants “and parties of dispute shall be duty bound to observe provisions of this law” 
or face criminal charges even though jirgas were only empowered to hear civil disputes 
and petty juvenile crimes on referral.141 Jirgas and shuras could not “make decisions that 
violate human rights of parties in dispute, especially of women and children,” and all 
judgments would have been subject to appeal to state courts.142 The law, however, was 
not passed as it met fierce opposition from the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and the 
Human Rights Commission, which feared that the law would lend credibility to 
“traditional” dispute resolution, which they view as antithetical to human rights standards 
and women’s rights.143  The state was open to engagement with the nonstate justice 
sectors but only on its own, stark terms. The central government’s internal divisions 
prevented the law from being promulgated, despite the unrealistic degree of authority for 
the state system it envisioned. Even if a law had been enacted, it is unlikely to have 
meaningfully altered the operation of dispute resolution at the local level given the 
weakness of state authority in many areas. 
 
REPRESSION. Afghan state and international forces sought to disturb and 
undermine the Taliban justice system. At the same time, these actors realized that the 
popular appeal of Taliban justice constituted a profound challenge to state authority. 
While rule-of-law programs were not trying to destroy the Taliban system and eliminate 
its core personnel, with the partial exception of ROLFF-A, they aimed to undermine the 
system’s appeal. Doing so proved remarkably difficult, however, because the state system 
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remained unappealing. By the end of 2014, it was clear that Taliban justice was a major 
and growing feature of the Afghan legal landscape. 
 
Learning from Lessons Not Learned 
Advancing the rule of law in Afghanistan presented a daunting challenge regardless 
of policy decisions undertaken by the U.S. but, though seemingly a distant memory, 
state-building efforts in Afghanistan started optimistically. The Taliban regime wilted 
away with minimal resistance. The new, multi-ethnic state under President Karzai had a 
real opportunity to demonstrate it was a legitimate governing entity.144 That opportunity 
was squandered, but it was squandered as a result of domestic and international policy 
choices. The Afghan state now faces a crisis of legitimacy and a powerful insurgency that 
promises the law and order the state has failed to provide, but to cast that outcome as 
inevitable serves to excuse bad policy and invites future disasters. Afghanistan is not 
alone. Advancing the rule of law after conflict will constitute a major foreign policy 
challenge for the foreseeable future. As a high degree of legal pluralism is the dominant 
feature of many societies, and particularly conflict-prone ones, future interventions and 
subsequent efforts to advance the rule of law will almost certainly occur in places marked 
by a high degree of legal pluralism, such as Yemen or Syria. As a result, Afghanistan 
offers a rich source of insights for helping to ensure future judicial state-building 
endeavors simply replicate the same mistakes as U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. 
 
A STITCH IN TIME… 
Afghanistan’s own history shows that a viable, legitimate order was certainly a 
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possibility. Before the late 1970s communist coup, the country had enjoyed decades of 
domestic tranquility, and the Taliban itself had previously established a monopoly on the 
use of force under even more chaotic conditions in the 1990s. After the end of Taliban 
rule in 2001, Afghanistan enjoyed relative peace before violence began to rapidly 
metastasize and fighting constituted “a full-blown insurgency by 2006.”145 Moreover, 
Afghanistan’s population has certainly demonstrated capacity for violence. At the same 
time, they prize order, as evidenced by the paramount role of Pashtunwali and other 
nonstate dispute resolution systems, and widespread acceptance of a national state for 
centuries, albeit a limited one. Thus, rather than bemoan the country’s hopelessness, it is 
important to critically examine how Afghanistan rule-of-law assistance and broader U.S. 
policy could have been undertaken more effectively. 
At the onset of post-conflict reconstruction, international actors have maximum 
influence and the broadest range of feasible options. 146  The state judicial sector in 
Afghanistan faced major entrenched challenges, including minimal infrastructure, serious 
human resources shortfalls, dubious legitimacy, and skepticism from the nonstate 
authorities that oversaw most local dispute resolution. There was a clear, constructive 
opportunity for international assistance to help address these issues. As the lead nation, 
however, Italy did little until 2003 and then achieved little until it was relieved of those 
duties in 2006. Italy’s performance has been rightly criticized, but the loss of this window 
of opportunity is not solely Italy’s fault. The U.S. decided to topple the Taliban and was 
by far the most dominant international player in determining policy afterwards. Italy’s 
lead-nation status was not inevitable or even particularly logical, but rather a reflection of 
the U.S. policy of outsourcing to other nations as many aspects of state-building as it 
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could during the crucial early period.  
 
ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION 
State legitimacy and institutional arrangements are vital for the development of the 
rule of law. International rule-of-law assistance is almost invariably mediated through 
state institutions and officials, even when targeting nonstate actors. It matters immensely 
whether the state is seen as legitimate and whether those entrusted with the state’s 
authority care about promoting a state bound by the rule of law. President Karzai’s 
regime was decidedly disinterested in the rule of law and opposed meaningful efforts to 
advance it. In general, policymakers should be deeply skeptical of the assurances of 
corrupt rulers with authoritarian tendencies. 
The international community also bears responsibility for aiding and abetting 
Afghanistan’s governance disaster. The rule of law is tightly linked to democratic 
accountability. The legal order is inexorably interconnected with a state’s political 
institutions.147 In theory, the “rule of law may exist without democratic forms of political 
will formation,” but on “empirical grounds” the rule of law has been inexorably linked 
with democratic government.148 Democratic rule does not inevitably produce the rule of 
law. Nevertheless, democracy appears to be a functional prerequisite.149 As Guillermo 
O’Donnell highlights, “Only under a democratic rule of law will the various agencies of 
electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively, without obstruction 
and intimidation from powerful state actors.” 150  In the early years, the international 
community exercised meaningful influence over the nascent Afghan state’s institutional 
structure. International backing secured the top state post for Karzai initially and 
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encouraged the president’s concentration of power. Once entrenched, this institutional 
arrangement proved resistant to change. Individuals who reach the top spot first have a 
disproportionate advantage going forward and can even use their position to undermine 
future democratic competition. 151  International actors need to be cautious with their 
support as well as push for institutional mechanisms such as free elections, political 
parties, and political accountability mechanisms to ensure that the people themselves 
have a real decision regarding who leads their country.  
As the U.S. viewed security as its top priority from the start, concern about the rule 
of law often fell to the background. Thus, the United States’ ability to promote the rule of 
law has been heavily circumscribed by its entrenched commitment to the regime and an 
emphasis on security over justice. Karzai’s administration sought to retain power and 
exercise authority unconstrained by law. In contrast, both Obama and Bush 
administration policymakers wanted an Afghan liberal democratic polity that embraced 
the rule of law, but consistently compromised that aspiration. The Karzai regime 
recognized that the U.S. policymakers believed that the state-building project in 
Afghanistan could not be seen to fail because to admit otherwise would have risked being 
seen as tacit acceptance of a Taliban victory. Over time, the Afghan state’s endemic, 
profound weakness gave the regime greater ability to operate with independence from its 
international backers as the prospect of a Taliban victory became increasingly plausible. 
Democracy and the rule of law demand more than free-and-fair elections, but 
electoral integrity is a prerequisite. Although U.S. policymakers expressed concerns 
about Afghan electoral processes, particularly after the initial presidential election in 
2004, they never pushed to ensure credible elections. Fraud was perpetrated on an 
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industrial scale in every election after 2004.152 Yet each time, U.S. officials expressed 
concerns only after the event, when it was too late to take serious action. They also did 
little as Karzai’s regime systematically sought to undermine the existence of political 
parties that could form the institutional bases for aggregating social interests, and 
methodically compromised the integrity of voting registration, oversight, and 
administration processes.153  U.S. commitments to promoting the rule of law cannot be 
effective or credible when democracy is not a policy priority.  
 
RETHINKING AID DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY 
Rule-of-law assistance in Afghanistan was itself problematic both in how it was 
implemented and how it was structured bureaucratically. In terms of implementation, 
U.S. efforts reflected fundamental failures of timing, coordination, and strategy. 
Assistance was scarce during the crucial early interval and then focused on unneeded and 
unwanted legislative reforms.154 Once funding began to dramatically increase, there was 
no plausible strategy as to how the assistance would actually advance the rule of law. 
Worse, once it became clear that subsidization was facilitating state corruption rather 
combatting it, aid was not reconsidered, reallocated, or halted. Subsidization efforts 
continued and expanded with no realistic vision for how assistance could be improved. 
Even today, U.S. officials show little interest in changing their approach to dealing with 
institutions decidedly disinterested in the rule of law. The latest USAID rule-of-law 
program, known as “Adalat,” has a major goal of “combatting corruption by empowering 
relevant Afghan Government agencies/institutions.” 155  The irony is presumably 
unintentional. Although implementers receive the most scrutiny, this perverse incentive 
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structure is fundamentally a policymaking issue. Most nongovernmental organizations 
must respond to donor-established incentives to survive.156 
Operationally, program coordination remained consistently abysmal from 2005 to 
2014. Even prior to the dramatic increase in rule-of-law expenditures under Obama’s 
Afghan surge, the U.S. State Department Office of Inspector General admitted there was 
“no way to readily identify ROL [rule of law] funding and subsequently to identify 
duplicate programs, overlapping programs, or programs conflicting with each other.”157  
Massive funding increases exacerbated these long-standing issues. It was unclear even 
how many programs there were or how much money had been spent.158 Throughout the 
period of U.S. engagement examined here, program strategy, implementation, and 
coordination problems were always being addressed but were never solved.  
These programming issues reflect larger, more profound problems within the U.S. 
international assistance bureaucracy. Donors, particularly USAID, demand extensive 
control over projects’ scope, content, and implementation to try to prove appropriate 
funding allocation and demonstrable achievements to its congressional overseers. This 
level of micromanagement was an especially bad fit for Afghanistan given the fluidity of 
the situation and the need for a nuanced, localized approach. If programs are supposed to 
be dynamic, there needs to be flexibility and an understanding that calculated risks are 
sometimes necessary. There also needs to be a willingness to halt program activities that 
are not working or end partnerships with interlocutors that lack any meaningful interest in 
promoting the rule of law. Currently, programs that fail to execute are viewed poorly by 
donors and endanger future contracts. Program implementers thus have strong incentives 
to collaborate with deeply corrupt states institutions. 
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The existing operational structure means that donors can design the program and 
continually display an almost willful blindness to political reality in the recipient country. 
The contracting system is not without significant flaws. Nevertheless, by definition the 
contractors’ job is simply to follow USAID’s directives.159 More generally, this dynamic 
institutionalizes an unaccountability loop whereby donors can blame contractors when 
programs go array, while contractors can claim that were simply following donor 
instructions. Although admittedly a somewhat remote prospect, fixing this dynamic will 
require that Congress takes a more nuanced understanding of how development 
assistance works and under what circumstances it can be most effective. 
 
ENGAGING JUSTICE HOLISTICALLY  
As with most conflict-prone states, nonstate justice mechanisms still handle the vast 
majority of disputes in Afghanistan. U.S. policymakers belatedly recognized nonstate 
justice as a major pillar of Afghanistan’s legal order, but they never seriously engaged 
nonstate justice as a pre-existing structure or an independent source of legitimate 
authority. Instead, preferred local interlocutors were labeled the key nonstate justice 
actors, independent of their actual social standing, and then bolstered through military 
force and outside funds. At minimum, successful policy engagement with the nonstate 
justice system of Pashtunwali demands “an understanding of the core principles of this 
cultural value system.”160  While rule-of-law programs researched local areas, outputs 
were fixed and unrelated to local realities because counterinsurgency was always the 
paramount goal. 
The results in Afghanistan also seriously challenge the dominant U.S. 
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counterinsurgency view that holds “establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end 
state.”161 Although the rule of law is certainly worthy as both, it takes decades and is 
invariably rooted in domestic politics.162 Thus, it is a long-term goal. Moreover, the rule 
of law cannot be promoted successfully absent powerful domestic constituencies and at 
least some high-level state officials who take the idea seriously. International rule-of-law 
efforts, whether geared towards counterinsurgency or simply trying to improve the 
quality and effectiveness of state courts, have a limited scope absent a state commitment 
to be bound by the law. Aid can easily become another source of rent extraction for a 
rentier state.163  
 
Conclusion 
Despite Afghanistan’s immense importance to U.S. foreign policy for more than a 
decade, rule-of-law aid has often been ad hoc, ineffective, predicated on widely 
optimistic assumptions and, at worst, has helped enable predatory state practices. The 
vast majority of aid served to prop up fundamentally compromised institutions, while 
democracy was jettisoned in pursuit of security and little thought was given to the 
constructive engagement of the tribal and religious actors who had long formed crucial 
pillars of legal legitimacy. International actors accepted President Karzai regime’s 
increasing dependence on warlords who lacked any interest in the rule of law. Over time, 
the Taliban and its justice system grew in strength and popular legitimacy, in large part as 
a response to the Karzai regime’s corruption and reliance on warlords. International 
interest in engagement with the nonstate justice sector, however, was focused primarily 
on counterinsurgency rather than justice. U.S. assistance ultimately produced few 
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benefits and, in certain instances, was even counterproductive.  
The situation in Afghanistan should not be taken as an invitation to nihilism, 
however. Afghanistan may be a case study in how many things can go wrong in post-
conflict state-building, but it crucially reflects policy decisions. Different decisions may 
well have produced more positive results. Taking democracy and legitimate governance 
seriously is a crucial first step. Policymakers and aid implementers need a realistic and 
compelling strategic vision rooted in a deep understanding of a country’s legal culture, 
politics, and history. Prompt action must then be taken to advance that vision.  Finally, 
realistic expectations are essential as developing the rule of law is a long-term process. 
Policymakers can benefit from being better able to conceptualize and respond to the 
challenges posed by judicial state-building in a legally pluralist society, such as 
Afghanistan. The U.S. never truly sought to engage with nonstate justice as a means to 
promote a more just legal order, but rather saw nonstate actors as mere cogs in a deeply 
flawed counterinsurgency approach. Counterfactuals are always fraught. Still, given the 
widespread desire for a more just legal order and Afghanistan’s history of state, tribal, 
and religious collaboration, a more constructive relationship was certainly possible and 
likely remains so today. Savvy strategic planning and pragmatic adaptation can improve 
state-building and rule of law efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but this will require 
tough choices and occasionally even rethinking the provision of aid.   
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